CADOGAN, William (c.1671-1726), of Caversham, Berks. and Jermyn Street, Westminster
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Family and Education
b. c.1671, 1st s. of Henry Cadogan, barrister, of Dublin and Liscarton, co. Meath, high sheriff of co. Meath 1700, by Bridget (d. 1721), da. of Sir Hardress Waller† of Castletown, co. Limerick, and bro. of Charles Cadogan†. educ. Westminster; Trinity, Dublin, 28 Mar. 1687, aged 15. m. c.1703, Margaretta Cecilia (d. 1749), da. of William Munter, councillor of supreme court of Holland, and niece of Adam Tripp, burgomaster, regent of Amsterdam, 2da. suc. fa. 1714. cr. Baron Cadogan of Reading 21 June 1716; Earl Cadogan 8 May 1718; KT 22 June 1716.1
Capt., Thomas Erle’s* ft. regt. 1694–8; maj. Inniskilling Drag. Gds. 1698; brevet col. of ft. 1701; q.m.g. 1701–12; commissary for Danish and Württemburg forces 1701; col. 6 Horse 1703–12; brig.-gen. 1704, maj.-gen. 1707, lt.-gen. 1709; lt. Tower of London 1706–13; col. 2 Ft. Gds. (Coldstream) 1714–June 1722, 1 Ft. Gds. (Grenadiers) June 1722–d.; gov. I. o. W. 1715–d.; c.-in-c. Scotland Feb.–May 1716; gen. 1717; master-gen. of the Ordnance 1722–5.2
Special envoy to Vienna and Hanover 1706; envoy to Brussels 1707–11, 1714–15, United Provinces 1707–10, 1714–July 1716, ambassador July 1716–21; master of the robes 1714–d.; PC 30 Mar. 1717; ambassador to Vienna 1719–20; ld. justice (regency) 1723.
High steward, Reading 1716; freeman, Portsmouth 1721.
Commr. Chelsea Hosp. 1722–d.3
Through his expertise in logistics Cadogan became the most trusted staff officer of the Earl (later Duke) of Marlborough (John Churchill†), a position which afforded him considerable power and influence in his own right, and from which eventually he launched his own career in high politics. He came of Welsh ancestry, though army service under the Earl of Strafford (Thomas Wentworth†) had taken his grandfather (William Cadogan†) to Ireland where he had settled and later proved an equally dutiful servant of the Parliament and Commonwealth as governor of Trim, co. Meath. Cadogan’s father, a prosperous Dublin lawyer, augmented the family estates in that county, particularly at Liscarton where he obtained the castle lands that William III had confiscated from the Talbot family which had formed part of the resumption of 1700. At his first election to Parliament in 1705, Cadogan was aspersed by the Tory newswriter John Dyer as a Whiggish upstart of questionable gentility: ‘on his father’s side his pedigree was proved by an epitaph that was made last summer by one at the herald’s office and was never yet upon a tomb’. The young Cadogan first made an impression on Marlborough during the Irish campaigns early in William’s reign, though it seems to have been the King himself who later prevailed on the Earl to give Cadogan a troop of horse. In April 1702 Marlborough was appointed to lead the allied armies and chose Cadogan, by then a proven military organizer, as his quartermaster-general. For the next ten years Cadogan was an integral part of the military high command, and was confided in by Marlborough almost as an equal.4
In January 1705 Marlborough was granted the royal manor of Woodstock and resolved to breach the interest of the Tory Earl of Abingdon (Montagu Venables-Bertie*) in the borough at the next electoral opportunity. Accordingly, at the general election four months later he proposed Cadogan as his own candidate. Marlborough’s choice of Cadogan for the Woodstock seat was a distinctive sign of his esteem for the gifted brigadier and was doubtless meant as a reward for his contribution to the recent military successes. But Cadogan’s presence in the Commons also gave Marlborough the practical advantage of having a personal representative there who could reliably report the moods of Members on matters touching the progress and cost of the war. Since Cadogan could not be released from duty abroad, Marlborough entrusted the management of the election to Henry St. John II*, the recently appointed secretary at war, and James Craggs I*, Marlborough’s chief ‘man of business’. Cadogan’s close acquaintanceship with both men, and others of the ‘Marlborough connexion’ such as James Stanhope*, Henry Watkins* and Adam Cardonnel*, was naturally dictated by his all-embracing military responsibilities. He was returned for Woodstock but only after a brisk and at times uncertain contest. Though he sat for the borough almost without intermission until his ennoblement in 1716, he rarely, if ever, had time to concern himself with the politics of his constituency, and though Marlborough gave him the use of North Lodge in Woodstock Park, he seems to have been a rare visitor. In an analysis of the new Parliament Lord Sunderland (Charles, Lord Spencer*) noted Cadogan’s election as a ‘gain’ for the Whigs. He was prevented, however, from taking his seat at the opening proceedings in October, Marlborough informing Lord Treasurer Godolphin (Sidney†) on the 9th that it was impossible for Cadogan’s departure from headquarters to precede his own. His first recorded appearance in parliamentary proceedings was soon after the Christmas recess, on 7 Jan. 1706, when appropriately he was appointed to a small committee of MPs directed to convey the thanks of the House to Marlborough ‘for his great services . . . in the last campaign’, the high point of which had been the victory at Blenheim. On 18 Feb. Cadogan voted with the Court against the ‘whimsical’ place clause of the regency bill. He returned to Holland at the beginning of April, and the following month was present at the battle of Ramillies. In August, much to Marlborough’s consternation, he was captured on a foraging expedition at Tournai. The Duke lost no time in arranging for an exchange, writing anxiously to Godolphin that Cadogan was ‘absolutely necessary for my ease’. Cadogan attended the Commons on 3 Dec., the first day of the new session, but by February 1707 had returned to the Low Countries to brief Dutch politicians on the forthcoming campaign.5
Cadogan’s multifarious responsibilities in running Marlborough’s campaigns provided him with ample opportunity to indulge in unscrupulous profiteering ventures. He was particularly close in his collaboration with Hon. James Brydges*, the paymaster-general. The two men may initially have concocted various money-making schemes when Brydges joined Marlborough on campaign in the summer of 1705, shortly after being appointed paymaster. Cadogan was soon one of Brydges’ leading accomplices in playing the gold market in the Low Countries, taking advantage of the varying exchange rates in different cities. With money remitted by Brydges, he bought cheaply, paid the army at higher rates and, with Brydges, pocketed the difference. These profitable operations were supplemented by purchases of gold which he later sold at profit to the army, and also investments in stocks on the basis of informed predictions about the likelihood of, and timing of peace. His full powers over forage-buying gave him ready access to other army funds for these and similar purposes. The gambler’s lust for quick gain, which had consumed Cadogan as a young officer in Ireland, had by no means left him: he was now in a position to play for far greater stakes, laying enormous wagers on the outcome of various military operations on the basis of his privileged insider’s knowledge. He was not always successful, however, and in 1707 lost heavily in a bet that Prince Eugene of Savoy would capture Toulon. His personal gains from these dubious enterprises were undoubtedly substantial. In 1707 he purchased the manor of Oakley in Buckinghamshire, within striking distance of Woodstock. This was followed in 1709 by the purchase of Caversham in Berkshire, an estate of over 1,000 acres, secured for him by Brydges, and in the same year he laid out a further £6,000 in Bank of England stock, thereby becoming one of the Bank’s principal stockholders. He also lent large sums to Holland during the course of the war, which he demanded back almost as soon as peace was concluded.6
Cadogan’s appointments in November 1707 as envoy extraordinary to Brussels and to The Hague were intended to complement his work as Marlborough’s adjutant. When not on campaign he spent most of his time at Brussels as the English representative in the Anglo-Dutch ‘condominium’ which governed the Spanish Netherlands from 1706 following its recapture from the French. He was thus well placed to ensure close co-operation with the Brussels government in all matters concerning the war’s progress, as well as to represent the commander’s views and interests. Initially, the arrangement was meant only to be temporary, but at Marlborough’s behest he was continued, having, as the Duke informed Godolphin in April 1708, ‘behaved himself so well this winter at Brussels’. These new responsibilities, however, allowed Cadogan even less time to attend the Commons. He seems to have made no appearance in the House during the winter months of 1707–8, and was certainly absent from the crucial ‘No Peace without Spain’ division on 19 Dec. 1707. In February 1708 he earned the ministry’s gratitude for his prompt despatch of regiments from Holland in readiness for the rumoured French invasion of Scotland. It was with evident dismay, however, that he learned of St. John’s resignation later the same month. ‘I am beyond expression concerned and surprised’, he wrote to Brydges. ‘I had a letter from him on that subject to justify the resolution he had taken. I am sorry he thought he had reason for it.’ To those such as Cadogan, deeply immersed in the prosecution of the war, the Harleyite resignations can only have spelt an escalation of domestic opposition to its continuance. At the general election in May he was re-elected at Woodstock in his absence, and in a subsequent list of the new House was classed as a Whig. In July he was with Marlborough at Oudenarde, but in November was too overstretched to leave his duties to attend the new Parliament. By March 1709 complaints from the army’s paymasters were evidently filtering through to him via Brydges about his mishandling of army money, whereupon he asked Brydges ‘to put a stop to the continuing our project of buying up gold in Holland’. It was probably to this criticism that he alluded in a highly disingenuous letter of 12 Mar. to Lord Raby at Berlin:
Blame and envy are the only fruits I have gathered out of the post I am still in, which I never asked for, nor desired to remain in, and to this minute I am a stranger to the reason why ’twas given me, or why ’tis not taken from me, since it creates so much offence.
He was apt to draw a veil over the growing anti-war opinion among the Tories in England, and thought the situation not very different from that prevailing in the United Provinces. ‘They have their Bromleys and their Hanmers here [The Hague]’, he wrote, ‘as well as we have in England, but the greater number of those which govern are in the true interests of their country and believe with us no peace can be secure without obtaining the whole monarchy of Spain.’ He was present at Malplaquet in September, but in a separate engagement a few days later was seriously wounded in the neck. Marlborough was in despair, not only for Cadogan’s life, as surgeons failed to locate the ball, but also because, as he told Sarah, ‘it will oblige me to do many things, by which I shall have but little rest’.7
The disintegration of Godolphin’s ministry in August 1710 brought in the Harleyite Tories dedicated to ending both the war and the ubiquitous Marlborough influence in politics. Cadogan could do little but watch developments at a distance and allow Marlborough’s fate to take its course. He professed himself willing to share the fortunes, whatever they might be, of ‘the great man to whom I am under such infinite obligations . . . I would be a monster if I did otherwise’. Certain that Parliament would be dissolved in the coming months, Marlborough requested his wife to ensure Cadogan’s re-election, anticipating Tory attacks on his conduct of the war when the House reassembled. He felt that Cadogan and Stanhope were the only MPs in his military entourage on whom he could rely for support, ‘for they have both honesty and courage to speak truth’. Appropriately enough, at Reading, a short distance from his newly acquired estate at Caversham, the Tory election slogan was ‘no Hanover, no Cadogan’. In December, Cadogan was perhaps not surprised to receive notice of dismissal from his diplomatic posts, an initial step in the ‘mortification’ of Marlborough. It was rumoured at this time that he had participated several times with, and even hosted, Generals Meredith* (Thomas), Macartney and Honeywood in drinking ‘confusion to the ministry’, and there was some belief that like them he would lose his military appointments, but the accusations against Cadogan were not pursued by the Court. By the end of December it was generally understood that he was to keep his posts ‘out of consideration for Marlborough, who cannot dispense with him’, dispelling the assumption then current that his lucrative lieutenancy of the Tower would go to Jack Hill, the brother of the Queen’s new favourite, Abigail Masham. After visiting England briefly in January 1711, Cadogan returned to the Continent for what proved his last campaign as Marlborough’s subaltern. Despite recent party recrimination Cadogan was cautious enough to maintain his old civility towards St. John, now secretary of state. The secretary was gratified that ‘you remember an old friend who never did anything to be forgot’.8
On 31 Dec. 1711 Marlborough was finally dismissed as commander-in-chief of the forces in the Low Countries. He informed Cadogan by letter the following day, but this did not reach The Hague until 8 Jan. This delay, and the difficulty in obtaining a passport, prevented Cadogan from complying with the Duke’s request to be in England by the 10th in connexion with the investigation by the commissioners of public accounts into Marlborough’s alleged peculations concerning bread contracts and the pay of the foreign troops. Cadogan was, however, able to furnish Marlborough’s urgent request for vital documentation illustrating his entitlement, in accordance with custom, to gratuities from bread contractors. Replying to the Duke on the 9th, he expressed profound ‘concern and astonishment at the fatal news’ and his own determination to quit the army, supposing ‘the favour of giving up my employments will be readily granted’. Cadogan poured out his despondency a few days later to Henry Watkins, the army’s judge-advocate and another of Marlborough’s devoted retainers:
We have, dear judge, in the course of our long acquaintance generally agreed in our opinions of men and things; this makes it easy for me to guess at the indisposition of mind you complain of, and the cause of it. I am deeply affected in the same part, and by the same distemper, and am so far gone in it, as not only to be tired of business and employments, but even weary of life itself. You know the bottom of my heart, therefore can better imagine than I describe the affliction and weight of grief I am under. I am uncertain, and I assure you unconcerned as to what becomes of myself. I shall act according to the strictest rules of gratitude, duty and honour in relation to our great, unfortunate benefactor, and my zeal, inclination and desire to serve and suffer for him are equal to the vast obligations and favours I have received from him. As to the rest I shall do as people at sea when the violence of the storm obliges them to abandon the helm and cut down the masts, I commit myself to the mercy of the winds and waves. Whether they force me to split on rocks, or whether my good fortune may throw a plank in my way to carry me ashore, I am grown so insensible or so resigned as to be no longer in pain about.
Despite his professions of total submission to Marlborough’s commands, Cadogan did not journey to England to participate on the Duke’s behalf in the censure debate on 24 Jan. which centred on the commissioners’ findings and which it was believed would be the prelude to impeachment. As the debate on the report approached, Marlborough may well have realized that his trusty lieutenant was almost as much a sitting target as himself, and that his presence in the House on so sensitive an occasion might easily spark calls for further inquiries. Cadogan’s own record of chicanery with army funds would hardly have helped Marlborough’s own predicament. Cadogan thus remained with the army in Flanders as its caretaker until a new commander was appointed. There were fresh predictions that he himself was about to fall from grace and lose the lieutenancy of the Tower, but while the Utrecht negotiations dragged on, his retention in the high command was seen as imperative. Cadogan’s value as a field commander was even trumpeted in a spate of Tory pamphlets in which Marlborough’s military genius was denigrated and ascribed to the acumen of subordinates, the principal of whom was Cadogan. In April, Cadogan’s name was omitted from the list of lieutenant-generals selected to serve under the newly appointed generalissimo, the Duke of Ormond, but, at Ormond’s express wish, for which St. John obtained the Queen’s approval, Cadogan joined the 1712 campaign as quartermaster general. Despite these continuing signs of favour, Cadogan’s retirement to Holland at the end of the campaigning season was evidently closely linked to Marlborough’s own decision, taken soon after Lord Godolphin’s death in September, to live abroad. On 1 Dec. he welcomed Marlborough to Ostend. Wishing still to appear in the good opinion of Lord Treasurer Oxford (Robert Harley*), Cadogan wrote in the most obsequious terms asking formal leave to attend the Duke in consideration of his ‘ill-health, the inconvenience a winter’s journey exposes him to, and his being without any one friend to accompany him’. The substance of Oxford’s reply, if any there was, is not known, but in the weeks following, Cadogan was required to sell his regiment, doing so to his second-in-command, Lieutenant-Colonel George Kellum, for £3,500, and was finally replaced as lieutenant of the Tower of London. There is also some suggestion that in January 1713 Oxford considered bringing separate censures against Cadogan for his endeavours to protect Marlborough, though Lord Strafford, the former Lord Raby, counselled moderation and advised Oxford
that it may be necessary to give him some encouragement, and to keep him in, since no man knows the Spanish Low Countries better than he does, nor is more expert in the affair of quarter-master general; and really without partiality, to one side or the other, I do believe the greatest part of Lord Marlborough’s victories are owing to him, and even the Pensionary said to me: ‘si vous voulez avoir un duc de Marlborough un Cadogan est nécessaire’. It would be well to keep him a little under, though you keep him still employed, and if you will let me know your sentiments as to my behaviour towards him I will be sure to observe them.
Oxford seems to have accepted the tenor of this advice, though if only to placate Dutch concern about the ministry’s apparent vindictiveness towards Marlborough, which Strafford evidently encountered at the peace negotiations. None the less, by the time the Lord Treasurer had received Strafford’s letter Cadogan had been dismissed from his remaining employments. This ostensible intervention by Strafford did nothing to allay Cadogan’s developing hatred of his former friend, whom he was willing to condemn alongside Oxford in 1715.9
Until the death of Queen Anne in August 1714 Cadogan was engaged almost constantly in a round of quasi-diplomatic activity, as Marlborough’s principal knight-errant in schemes to secure the Protestant succession in the Hanoverian dynasty. It says much for Cadogan’s continued attachment to the ageing and ill ex-commander-in-chief that he was prepared to seek the acquiescence of allied statesmen in warlike schemes that were largely impracticable and bordered on the hare-brained. Yet Cadogan shared the Duke’s obsessive belief that the Oxford ministry was preparing for a Jacobite restoration, and was joined by such other associates of Marlborough as the Duke’s son-in-law, the Earl of Sunderland, and James Craggs I, still his agent in London. Cadogan’s role in this covert, if inconclusive, activity was crucial. Foreign ministers, many of whom he knew personally, were more willing to meet him since he was less conspicuous than Marlborough. He also maintained contacts between the Duke and the leading Whigs in London, a process which quickly raised his own importance within the Whig party. During the first months of 1713 Cadogan worked assiduously to obtain support for Marlborough’s somewhat far-fetched plan for an allied invasion of England that would usher in an ‘honest’ administration to preserve the Protestant succession. But neither Hanover, the Dutch nor the Emperor, the intended participants, regarded the proposal with any seriousness. It was soon superseded by another, put forward by Bernstorff, the principal Hanoverian minister, to establish a pro-Hanoverian defensive superiority in England upon the Queen’s death. Cadogan himself was to take command of forces in London. In March he was able to report Marlborough’s endorsement of the plan to Bothmer, the Elector’s envoy at The Hague. It was plain, however, that the entire plan was contingent upon the Queen’s death, of which there seemed no immediate prospect. Marlborough and Cadogan thus pursued their own quest for Imperial support for an invasion to overset the Tory government. They also spent much time goading the Hanoverian ministers to take positive action against the Oxford ministry and to send the electoral prince to London. In the summer Cadogan had high hopes that the impending general election would restore Whig fortunes, but he badly miscalculated the national mood. News of the Whigs’ failure at the polls brought him to England early in September for consultations at Althorp with Sunderland, Craggs and others about future tactics. John Drummond*, the government’s agent at The Hague, informed the lord treasurer that Cadogan had announced his intention of taking an active part in the new Parliament, ‘and his being chosen at Woodstock makes people believe that his party is grown strong’. The Althorp gathering may well have discussed means of exploiting the disenchantment some Tory MPs bore towards the ministry, for shortly afterwards Cadogan was advocating to Schütz, the Hanoverian envoy in London, that the motions the Hanoverians had proposed for the ensuing parliamentary session might be made by amenable Tories, such as Archibald Hutcheson*, rather than by Whig Members. Cadogan, along with Marlborough, was even prepared to lend the Elector £20,000 for the purposes of building up a pro-Hanoverian faction among the ‘poor lords’ in the Upper House. He still believed, as he made clear to the Hanoverian ministers, that a continuance of ‘the war of the Empire against France’ would be of the ‘greatest advantage’ to the Whig party.10
The Queen’s serious illness at the end of 1713 inspired a more ambitious plan from Marlborough for launching a Hanoverian invasion at her demise. Cadogan once again served as the Duke’s emissary in seeking promises of Dutch and Imperial assistance. But from mid-March 1714 the pattern of Cadogan’s exertions radically changed. The Pretender’s refusal at this juncture to renounce his Roman faith extinguished any ministerial designs of offering him the crown. Henceforward, Cadogan’s involvement in efforts to ensure the peaceable accession of the Hanoverian dynasty narrowed to the domestic front. Both he and Stanhope were active, for example, in enlisting the support of key domestic interests such as the merchants and monied men of the City. Cadogan had returned to London from The Hague towards the end of February for the new parliamentary session, not least because the validity of his own election at Woodstock the previous summer had been challenged by Tory petitioners. The election was declared void on 16 Mar. but he was re-elected without opposition eight days later. On 22 Apr. he spoke against the Tory motion to agree with the Lords’ address setting out Parliament’s confidence in the Utrecht peace. He replied to William Bromley II’s* assertion that there had been a difference of opinion among the allies in 1711 about the cessation of arms, and that the States General had been at variance with Marlborough in their wish to avoid fighting. Cadogan pointed out that in fact all the generals bar one (unnamed) had on that occasion thought it unnecessary to give battle. He then went on to criticize the continuing vulnerability of the barrier between French and Dutch territory, and refuted Bromley’s acclamation of the Utrecht peace settlement, pointing out that though there had been consistent allied success, much had been sacrificed at the negotiating table, before venturing his opinion that had the war been continued a little longer, the allies would have arrived at ‘the heart of France’. From the end of April Cadogan acted as intermediary in the lord treasurer’s negotiations with Marlborough, by which the former hoped to rescue his beleaguered ministry through an accommodation with the Whigs. Progress was effectively halted, however, in July when Oxford’s duplicitous intentions towards the Whigs were exposed. It is quite conceivable that by the end of the month, with Marlborough poised to return, in all probability to form a new Whig ministry, Cadogan harboured real expectations of high ministerial office. But any such pretensions were cut short by the Queen’s death on 1 Aug. and the inauguration of the pre-arranged Council of State from which Marlborough’s and Sunderland’s names had been omitted.11
In his subsequent career, Cadogan was a loyal, if ham-handed, servant of the Sunderland–Stanhope ministry. He remained MP for Woodstock until raised to the peerage in 1716. At the 1715 election he stood both at Woodstock and at Reading, having declined the chance of being returned for the more populous constituency of Westminster to which he had been warmly pressed. Almost from its beginning, the new reign offered him opportunities which amply fed a swelling ambition. Though he had come into his own as a Whig politician, his reputation was too obviously built upon the fame of the ‘great man’. With his gauche ebullience, matched by his bulky appearance, he cut a somewhat implausible figure among subtler ministerial minds. His schooling and experience in domestic politics had been minimal. Entrusted with sensitive diplomatic tasks essential to the preservation of European peace, his want of tact and finesse only irritated such thoroughbred diplomatists as Horace Walpole II*. His old friend Lord Stanhope could not but note with amusement in 1719 Cadogan’s over-mighty ‘notion of being premier ministre’. The Townshend–Walpole faction despised him for the unshakeable esteem in which he was regarded by the King. He knew the German language, shared the King’s views on military and diplomatic affairs, and was well acquainted with the King’s Hanoverian ministers. Following Marlborough’s debilitating stroke in 1716 the command of the army passed to Cadogan, and on the Duke’s death in 1722, he was appointed in succession as master-general of the Ordnance. Despite his clumsy attempt in 1723 to assume Marlborough’s title of commander-in-chief, it was another two years before Sunderland’s ministerial successors, Robert Walpole II* and Lord Townshend, succeeded in having him replaced with his old arch-enemy, the Duke of Argyll. This was undoubtedly the deepest of humiliations for Cadogan, who saw Argyll’s ambitions as rival to his own. Moreover, he had never forgotten Argyll’s part, as one of the powerful ‘middle party’, in the destruction of the Godolphin ministry, which in turn had led to the downfall of his own master.12
Cadogan died on 17 July 1726 at his residence at Kensington Gravelpits, Surrey, in his 57th year, and was buried at Westminster Abbey. In the absence of a male heir, the earldom became extinct, but the barony awarded under the 1718 patent passed by special remainder to his younger brother Charles.13
Ref Volumes: 1690-1715
Author: Andrew A. Hanham
- 1. PCC 223 Plymouth; Burke, Peerage (1939) 458; Recs. Old Westminsters, i. 155–6; Al. Dub. 126; Saint-Simon Mems. ed. Boislisle, xxxiv. 87.
- 2. DNB; HMC 3rd Rep. 189–90; Add. 39860, f. 90.
- 3. DNB; R. East, Portsmouth Recs. 377.
- 4. Lipscomb, Bucks. i. 353; DNB (Cadogan, William [1601–61]); K. S. Bottigheimer, Eng. Money and Irish Land, 200; Repts. Commrs. Pub. Recs. Ire. 1821–5, p. 356; Coll. of Several Paragraphs out of Mr Dyer’s Letters (Bodl. Rawl. D.863, f. 89); W. S. Churchill, Marlborough, i. 535; Cunningham, Hist. GB, i. 246.
- 5. Marlborough–Godolphin Corresp. 417, 426, 503, 645, 647, 648; Add. 61131, f. 126; VCH Oxon. xii. 465; Luttrell, Brief Relation, vi. 34.
- 6. Huntington Lib. Q. xv. 21–44; Add. 22196, f. 99; 47025, ff. 69–70; Lipscomb, i. 354; E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, 100; Egerton 3359 (unfol.); HMC Portland, v. 426.
- 7. Marlborough–Godolphin Corresp. 926, 927, 961, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1380; Studs. in Dipl. Hist. eds. Hatton and Anderson, 61; H. T. Dickinson, Bolingbroke, 59; Huntington Lib. Q. xv. 30; Add. 22196, f. 194.
- 8. DNB; Marlborough–Godolphin Corresp. 1590, 1591, 1596, 1603; Monod thesis, 211; Bolingbroke Corresp. i. 62, 118; Wentworth Pprs. 162, 164, 165; Swift Stella, 121; HMC Var. ix. 355.
- 9. Add. 61160, f. 140; 47026, f. 110; Churchill, iv. 509–10; Bolingbroke Corresp. ii. 136, 258, 275; Boyer, Pol. State, iii. 249; iv. 331; HMC Portland, v. 257–8; ix. 323; G. M. Trevelyan, Eng. under Q. Anne, ii. 120; Jnl. Soc. Army Hist. Res. xxxix. 5.
- 10. Hist. Jnl. xv. 593–618; Boyer, Pol. State, vi. 184; G. Holmes, Pol. in Age of Anne, 291; HMC Portland, v. 330; Orig. Pprs. ed. Macpherson, ii. 502, 521.
- 11. Hist. Jnl. xv. 609–18; Rapin, Hist. Eng. ii. 347; Orig. Pprs. ii. 570; Boyer, Pol. State, vii. 244–5; Add. 70293, Henry Watkins to ‘Mr Harley’, 2 Apr. 1714; Wentworth Pprs. 378; Oley Douglas* diary (Hist. of Parl. trans.), 22 Apr. 1714.
- 12. Coxe, Ld. Walpole, i. 19; Wentworth Pprs. 441; Add. 61161, f. 43; DNB; J. H. Plumb, Walpole, i. 282; Thompson, 202–3; A. J. Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline, 28; Orig. Pprs. ii. 502.
- 13. Westminster Abbey Reg. (Harl. Soc. x), 318; The Gen. n.s. vii. 45.